Day 38
Technically, I wrote Day 37 all of three hours ago, but I'm up late writing an essay, so I figured what the hell, it's technically day 38!
The essay is in two parts, regarding aspects of Descartes' philosophical works. Here is part II, on one of his two criteria for determining if a being is in fact a rational being. I promise, the material is interesting as well as highly relevent to modern thinking. Enjoy!
II. The subject of this discussion will be Descartes and his method by which to differentiate rational humans from beasts (non-human animals) and hypothetically constructed mechanical creatures. After outlining and expanding on Descartes argument in favour of language as a determining characteristic of humanity, I will rebut that while this test may distinguish humans from non-humans, it does not necessarily distinguish between things that are and are not conscious, or self-aware, or capable of pleasure/suffering.
First, he hypothesizes artificially created (in opposition to being created by God) machines that possess the same behaviours and dispositions as certain non-human animals. Descartes imagines that there would be absolutely no way to determine just which creatures were made artificially and which were not. Second, he supposes human-like machines and argues the following: “…if there were any such machines that bore resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as far as this is practically feasible, we would always have two very certain means of recognizing that they were not at all, for that reason, true men.”
The second of the two tests regards the notion of practical skill; Descartes believes that while any given machine may be better than humans at one or two things, humans are skilled at a diversity of things. This will not however be my focus.
Descartes’ first test, which I believe to be more forceful, is this: “They (machines) could never use words or other signs, or put them together in order as we do to declare our thoughts to others… it could not arrange its words differently so as to respond to the sense of all that will be said in its presence, as even the dullest men can do.”
This same criterion can be applied directly to distinguishing humans from non-human animals. Pre-empting objections, Descartes argues that the deficiency cannot be on the part of physical composition, as some animals are speech-capable (parrots) but do not meet the parameters of the first test. He also argues against the possibility that animals use language that is simply unrecognizable to humans, stating that as animals and humans have highly similar organic compositions, humans would surely be able to understand if animals had language. And finally, Descartes believes that even the dullest of humans is able to pass the first test, while the very smartest and finest-bred animals cannot.
Let us now deduce a few of the main conclusions that Descartes is committed to. First, he believes that possession of rationality is not a matter of degree, but a matter of absolutes; there is no such thing as a “level” to which a being is rational, it either is or is not. The difference between humans of various levels of intelligence must be a difference in the degree to which humans use their capacities. Second, it stands to reason that animals, if without souls, are merely well-designed response mechanisms, and whose behaviour must therefore be, theoretically, utterly deterministic. That is, with complete knowledge of any given stimulus, as well as the composition and operations of the creature to which said stimulus is given, we’d be able to predict with precision how it will respond. This explains why the link from animals to machines is consistent within his thought experiment. Third, it would be impossible that any non-thinking thing could fully resemble a human, since that resemblance would require things that non-thinking beings cannot accomplish. Since Descartes believes it obvious that even the dumbest humans are rational, it would follow that no matter how complex a machine or animal, it could not reach the standards we observe in even the dumbest humans. This is highly questionable, but I will not pursue the line. Finally, it is the case that man’s autonomy is a result of his possession of a soul, something which necessarily is of a wholly different substance from the physical – as the soul-less animals/machines could be physically identical to a human but still not contain what it is that makes something a human. This kind of self-awareness juxtaposed against the instinctual “passions” of non-humans is consistent with the way in which Descartes generates an epistemological foundation in the Meditations.
Let us for the sake of argument grant Descartes his criterion, and agree that this particular test of regarding creative language is something that all (or nearly all) and only humans can pass, and that all non-humans fail. So, if the question is “Does this test reliably distinguish between humans and non-humans?” the answer would be yes. However, it does not follow from this that we can distinguish between thinking and non-thinking things. Logically, even if we accept Descartes’ conclusion that language use is a sufficient condition for believing a creature is human, it does not follow that language use is a necessary condition, for it is quite easy to imagine a rational being who simply does not develop a language with which to express its thoughts; perhaps not for lack of ability, but for lack of motivation or need. Call this fellow the anti-social rational being, if you will. The idea here is essentially that Descartes has committed a form of anthropocentrism, in his belief that if any being is rational (i.e. soul-possessing) it will certainly resemble humans in this particular way. What Descartes has actually done, at most, is demonstrate that if a being uses language in a creative way, it must be a rational being. The status of a being that does not use language is still open to question.
If we were to stop here, we’d be able to form a group of thinking things; namely all things which use language in a creative way (rather than an automated stimulus-response way, or not at all), but we’d be quite unsure of just what things to include and exclude from this group, because language is not a sufficient determinate. This would be highly unsatisfying for Descartes, because he wants to make very clear that all and only humans are the thinking things of the world, but while his line of reasoning might create a special category for thinking language users, it does do all the philosophical work that Descartes wants it to do.
The essay is in two parts, regarding aspects of Descartes' philosophical works. Here is part II, on one of his two criteria for determining if a being is in fact a rational being. I promise, the material is interesting as well as highly relevent to modern thinking. Enjoy!
II. The subject of this discussion will be Descartes and his method by which to differentiate rational humans from beasts (non-human animals) and hypothetically constructed mechanical creatures. After outlining and expanding on Descartes argument in favour of language as a determining characteristic of humanity, I will rebut that while this test may distinguish humans from non-humans, it does not necessarily distinguish between things that are and are not conscious, or self-aware, or capable of pleasure/suffering.
First, he hypothesizes artificially created (in opposition to being created by God) machines that possess the same behaviours and dispositions as certain non-human animals. Descartes imagines that there would be absolutely no way to determine just which creatures were made artificially and which were not. Second, he supposes human-like machines and argues the following: “…if there were any such machines that bore resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as far as this is practically feasible, we would always have two very certain means of recognizing that they were not at all, for that reason, true men.”
The second of the two tests regards the notion of practical skill; Descartes believes that while any given machine may be better than humans at one or two things, humans are skilled at a diversity of things. This will not however be my focus.
Descartes’ first test, which I believe to be more forceful, is this: “They (machines) could never use words or other signs, or put them together in order as we do to declare our thoughts to others… it could not arrange its words differently so as to respond to the sense of all that will be said in its presence, as even the dullest men can do.”
This same criterion can be applied directly to distinguishing humans from non-human animals. Pre-empting objections, Descartes argues that the deficiency cannot be on the part of physical composition, as some animals are speech-capable (parrots) but do not meet the parameters of the first test. He also argues against the possibility that animals use language that is simply unrecognizable to humans, stating that as animals and humans have highly similar organic compositions, humans would surely be able to understand if animals had language. And finally, Descartes believes that even the dullest of humans is able to pass the first test, while the very smartest and finest-bred animals cannot.
Let us now deduce a few of the main conclusions that Descartes is committed to. First, he believes that possession of rationality is not a matter of degree, but a matter of absolutes; there is no such thing as a “level” to which a being is rational, it either is or is not. The difference between humans of various levels of intelligence must be a difference in the degree to which humans use their capacities. Second, it stands to reason that animals, if without souls, are merely well-designed response mechanisms, and whose behaviour must therefore be, theoretically, utterly deterministic. That is, with complete knowledge of any given stimulus, as well as the composition and operations of the creature to which said stimulus is given, we’d be able to predict with precision how it will respond. This explains why the link from animals to machines is consistent within his thought experiment. Third, it would be impossible that any non-thinking thing could fully resemble a human, since that resemblance would require things that non-thinking beings cannot accomplish. Since Descartes believes it obvious that even the dumbest humans are rational, it would follow that no matter how complex a machine or animal, it could not reach the standards we observe in even the dumbest humans. This is highly questionable, but I will not pursue the line. Finally, it is the case that man’s autonomy is a result of his possession of a soul, something which necessarily is of a wholly different substance from the physical – as the soul-less animals/machines could be physically identical to a human but still not contain what it is that makes something a human. This kind of self-awareness juxtaposed against the instinctual “passions” of non-humans is consistent with the way in which Descartes generates an epistemological foundation in the Meditations.
Let us for the sake of argument grant Descartes his criterion, and agree that this particular test of regarding creative language is something that all (or nearly all) and only humans can pass, and that all non-humans fail. So, if the question is “Does this test reliably distinguish between humans and non-humans?” the answer would be yes. However, it does not follow from this that we can distinguish between thinking and non-thinking things. Logically, even if we accept Descartes’ conclusion that language use is a sufficient condition for believing a creature is human, it does not follow that language use is a necessary condition, for it is quite easy to imagine a rational being who simply does not develop a language with which to express its thoughts; perhaps not for lack of ability, but for lack of motivation or need. Call this fellow the anti-social rational being, if you will. The idea here is essentially that Descartes has committed a form of anthropocentrism, in his belief that if any being is rational (i.e. soul-possessing) it will certainly resemble humans in this particular way. What Descartes has actually done, at most, is demonstrate that if a being uses language in a creative way, it must be a rational being. The status of a being that does not use language is still open to question.
If we were to stop here, we’d be able to form a group of thinking things; namely all things which use language in a creative way (rather than an automated stimulus-response way, or not at all), but we’d be quite unsure of just what things to include and exclude from this group, because language is not a sufficient determinate. This would be highly unsatisfying for Descartes, because he wants to make very clear that all and only humans are the thinking things of the world, but while his line of reasoning might create a special category for thinking language users, it does do all the philosophical work that Descartes wants it to do.
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