Day 39
And now, I present part one of the essay on Descartes. If you've yet to read part two (Day 38), read this first, it helps. Enjoy!
I. The subject of this discussion will be Descartes’ heavy reliance on the metaphysical stance of the rational mind when it comes to the practice of gaining knowledge of the world. This we might call the psychologizing, or subjectification of knowledge. I will outline the epistemological foundation Descartes’ lays down specifically in the second of the Meditations, and hook this up with some of his general conclusions about what academic practices are and are not reliable and worthwhile in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind.
By the second meditation, Descartes is convinced that he has cast into doubt the reality of absolutely everything doubtable – from sensory experiences down to their foundations in matter and extension, down to even logical and mathematical truths – and makes an attempt to re-build knowledge on the basis of what be believes to be one undeniable fact: he, as a thinking thing, exists. To expand a little: the idea is that we are always the subjects of experience, as well as the subjects of thought. I cannot imagine, think about, feel, or sense anything whatever without immediately accepting the prima facie assumption that there is an “I” that is the subject of these imaginings, thoughts, feelings, and experiences.
What Descartes also wants to conclude in the Meditations is that the rational man has autonomy, or self-rule. From his proof for the existence of a non-deceiving God in the third meditation, Descartes concludes that his thoughts are not only his own, but that at least on certain basic levels they are not misguided. Other important conclusions are made the become relevant to the Rules, especially his very stark distinction between the absolute truth values of mathematics and geometry, and the more transitive truth values of sensory experience. In somewhat of a Platonic tradition, Descartes notes that knowledge gained from sensory experience is of a lesser sort, in that qualia depend very much not merely on the external physical world, but on the relationship between that world and our sensory apparati. On the other hand, a truth such as a geometrical or mathematical law is neither derived from sensory experience, nor dependant upon it, nor ever contradictable by it, and therefore is the sort of truth that can be relied upon with absolute conviction.
So let us take these notions and bring them along to the Rules, in order they should become the basis for some of the rather controversial
The first three rules offer the imperative of directing the mind toward truth; but not just truth, absolute truth. It is in the second rule that Descartes argues that probable truths are not truths at all, and should be of no concern or reliability to those whose minds are properly directed! “…only arithmetic and geometry are free from every taint of falsity and uncertainty.”(p. 4) And it is in the third that Descartes notes the constant disagreement of scholars when it comes to ‘knowledge’ of things dependant upon experience.
Rules four through six concern method, arguing that the mind has an inherent sense of curiosity and motivation and discover and order the world around it. Descartes urges control, sensibility, and most importantly the search for truths of the simple sort. Scientific knowledge, as he calls it, does not ever hinge upon all sorts of fact-learning, but rather upon rational processes that any person can use. For this reason, fields of study so esoteric as to alienate most people are those Descartes treats with the most skepticism.
The rest of the rules follow these same basic themes; Descartes emphasizes that scientific knowledge is beyond nobody’s reach, and that the mind ought to be directed toward truths of the deductive sort over all others, and ought not to engage in the superfluous activity of studying and ordering those things which are by their nature possible to doubt, and subject to change. It is reiterated that the results of study, when directed in such a way, might be very modest in its depth, breadth, and accessibility, and that this is precisely what they ought to be.
You might say that for all intents and purposes, Descartes did a very good job of following his own rules when he penned the Meditations. Let us summarize, with respect to our original topic of the psychologizing, or subjectification of knowledge. We begin as Descartes did with the necessary subject and his God, the axes around which the world revolves. The subject has his autonomous rational mind, and the knowledge that the world is not, on the whole, a deception. The best knowledge (aside from knowledge of the self) is that which does not rely upon the sensory apparatus or the transitive nature of the physical world: knowledge of the mathematical and geometrical sort. In the rules, Descartes wants to express that the rational subject is very much a being of needs and desires, who can easily be misdirected toward complex but fruitless intellectual adventures, but who can also be properly directed toward the kinds of truths about the world that are worthwhile. In that this worthwhile knowledge has a kind of ontological status independent from the individual and his senses, the individual’s status is as subject to it, rather than its progenitor. The simplicity of truth that Descartes enunciates implies that his rules are not so much intended as ways to impose oneself upon intellectual discovery, but rather as ways to allow oneself to happen upon it.
I. The subject of this discussion will be Descartes’ heavy reliance on the metaphysical stance of the rational mind when it comes to the practice of gaining knowledge of the world. This we might call the psychologizing, or subjectification of knowledge. I will outline the epistemological foundation Descartes’ lays down specifically in the second of the Meditations, and hook this up with some of his general conclusions about what academic practices are and are not reliable and worthwhile in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind.
By the second meditation, Descartes is convinced that he has cast into doubt the reality of absolutely everything doubtable – from sensory experiences down to their foundations in matter and extension, down to even logical and mathematical truths – and makes an attempt to re-build knowledge on the basis of what be believes to be one undeniable fact: he, as a thinking thing, exists. To expand a little: the idea is that we are always the subjects of experience, as well as the subjects of thought. I cannot imagine, think about, feel, or sense anything whatever without immediately accepting the prima facie assumption that there is an “I” that is the subject of these imaginings, thoughts, feelings, and experiences.
What Descartes also wants to conclude in the Meditations is that the rational man has autonomy, or self-rule. From his proof for the existence of a non-deceiving God in the third meditation, Descartes concludes that his thoughts are not only his own, but that at least on certain basic levels they are not misguided. Other important conclusions are made the become relevant to the Rules, especially his very stark distinction between the absolute truth values of mathematics and geometry, and the more transitive truth values of sensory experience. In somewhat of a Platonic tradition, Descartes notes that knowledge gained from sensory experience is of a lesser sort, in that qualia depend very much not merely on the external physical world, but on the relationship between that world and our sensory apparati. On the other hand, a truth such as a geometrical or mathematical law is neither derived from sensory experience, nor dependant upon it, nor ever contradictable by it, and therefore is the sort of truth that can be relied upon with absolute conviction.
So let us take these notions and bring them along to the Rules, in order they should become the basis for some of the rather controversial
The first three rules offer the imperative of directing the mind toward truth; but not just truth, absolute truth. It is in the second rule that Descartes argues that probable truths are not truths at all, and should be of no concern or reliability to those whose minds are properly directed! “…only arithmetic and geometry are free from every taint of falsity and uncertainty.”(p. 4) And it is in the third that Descartes notes the constant disagreement of scholars when it comes to ‘knowledge’ of things dependant upon experience.
Rules four through six concern method, arguing that the mind has an inherent sense of curiosity and motivation and discover and order the world around it. Descartes urges control, sensibility, and most importantly the search for truths of the simple sort. Scientific knowledge, as he calls it, does not ever hinge upon all sorts of fact-learning, but rather upon rational processes that any person can use. For this reason, fields of study so esoteric as to alienate most people are those Descartes treats with the most skepticism.
The rest of the rules follow these same basic themes; Descartes emphasizes that scientific knowledge is beyond nobody’s reach, and that the mind ought to be directed toward truths of the deductive sort over all others, and ought not to engage in the superfluous activity of studying and ordering those things which are by their nature possible to doubt, and subject to change. It is reiterated that the results of study, when directed in such a way, might be very modest in its depth, breadth, and accessibility, and that this is precisely what they ought to be.
You might say that for all intents and purposes, Descartes did a very good job of following his own rules when he penned the Meditations. Let us summarize, with respect to our original topic of the psychologizing, or subjectification of knowledge. We begin as Descartes did with the necessary subject and his God, the axes around which the world revolves. The subject has his autonomous rational mind, and the knowledge that the world is not, on the whole, a deception. The best knowledge (aside from knowledge of the self) is that which does not rely upon the sensory apparatus or the transitive nature of the physical world: knowledge of the mathematical and geometrical sort. In the rules, Descartes wants to express that the rational subject is very much a being of needs and desires, who can easily be misdirected toward complex but fruitless intellectual adventures, but who can also be properly directed toward the kinds of truths about the world that are worthwhile. In that this worthwhile knowledge has a kind of ontological status independent from the individual and his senses, the individual’s status is as subject to it, rather than its progenitor. The simplicity of truth that Descartes enunciates implies that his rules are not so much intended as ways to impose oneself upon intellectual discovery, but rather as ways to allow oneself to happen upon it.
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