Day 77
I presented my honours thesis today. It was a 15 minute speech, followed by a 15 minute question period. The essay has yet to be written, but when it is I will probably not post it, for it will be fairly obscure and highly technical in nature.
However, I can post for your interest a transcript of today's speech. It is highly accessible and contemporary. Enjoy:
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Good Afternoon. My presentation today will focus primarily on Memetics, which is a hypothesized branch of science that we might also name cultural evolution devised originally by Richard Dawkins in his book “The selfish Gene.” My intention is to outline his theories of gene selection and its analogous meme selection and one or two of their applications, briefly, before moving along to the primary text to which I’ll be responding: an essay by the philosopher Dan Sperber criticizing the empirical force of the theory.
To begin: Richard Dawkins is what they call a gene selectionist. In studying the evolution of creatures, we must have some understanding of what kinds of traits are being selected for, and even more importantly, what it is that is being selected. When we think of selection for, our minds are typically drawn to standard examples such as the adaptationist advantage that the faster lion might have, the peacock with the most vivid plumage, the salmon who can swim upstream just a little bit better than its counterparts. You may all remember this from the discussion of Dennet and Fodor from two weeks back.
But what are the things being selected, specifically? Are we to say that the faster lion is selected (or at least, that it is the more probable candidate for selection)? After all, it will likely catch more prey, and thus position itself as a tempting mate within the pride. Selection on the level of the individual creature is an intuitive step, but as Dawkins argues, an incorrect one. As is thinking the unit of selection to be the group of animals, or even the species. We might best see the pride of lions itself as the unit of selection, competing with other prides for territory and survival. But again, incorrect.
The fundamental unit of selection is in fact the gene, argues Dawkins. Genes have their composition, which we call genotype, and their actual expression, which we call their phenotype. I have genotypes for blue eyes and green eyes, but my phenotype is blue, for example. When we look at evolutionary processes, try to explain them, even predict them, form experiments with them, we are best equipped to do these things when we understand that genes are the evolutionary units of selection, and that the bodies they inhabit are simply their vehicles. The fast lion is not being selected, the selected thing is rather that gene in the lion whose phenotype is this extra boost of speed.
Hence the title of his book “The Selfish Gene.” Genes are replicators; things that copy for their own sake. The word selfish implies some kind of consciousness which is of course not there, but what Dawkins means by the word is this: "the quality of being copied by a Darwinian selection process." Selfish, is a metaphor, much the same way we use the word designed metaphorically to describe the wonders of nature. Evolutionary theorists often run into trouble with these words, for when they are used, the theorists inevitably get lambasted by intelligent design proponents and quoted out of context in Jehovas’ Witness pamphlets.
Let us move forward. Memetics is fundamentally a theory that draws an analogy between bits of genetic information and bits of cultural information. We are to understand beliefs, songs, fashion trends, works of literature, quotable quotes, as units of cultural selection. That is to say, cultural ideas undergo the same kind of selective process that genes do. Their environment is our collective consciousness, and their survival and reproduction depends on the degree to which they have sticking power within minds, and the degree to which people are compelled to propagate them. Dawkins’ hailed example is religion; the belief-memes of a higher power, a divine moral authority, an immortal soul, and the like. These memes are incredibly appealing to humans, and thus have great sticking power. Those who do believe such things are compelled to propagate the information, to spread the word of the lord, as it were. Minds are vehicles, being occupied by selfish, replicating memes. As Dawkins believes, memes of the religious sort act very much the way that viruses do, invading minds, and simply making sure that they are propagated adequately before their hosts eventually die in their Jihad, or Crusade, or Inquisition.
And there you have the theory of Memetics. In the words of Dennett, another other big-name proponent: “A scholar is just a library’s way of making another library.”
Dan Sperber’s understanding of Memetics is essentially the same as the one I’ve described. His objection is roughly this: even if we can distinguish between individual units of cultural information, and in some sense view them as being passed along from person to person with varying degrees of success and failure, we cannot view memes as units of selection in any empirically workable way because memes are not being copied. The problem for Memetics has to do with why some memes are more appealing to the mind than others, why some are more easily understood, and more desirable to hold on to and disseminate then others. The basis for these things is often genetic. The cover of Time magazine about one year back was titled “The God Gene;” the article argued that a genetic disposition toward belief in a higher power is a likelihood. Chomsky argues with a large measure of academic acceptance that human language is in some sense a “filling in” of innate, genetically predisposed linguistic structures. I wouldn’t hesitate to say that there is a genetic basis for the human compulsion to order the sensory world; to explain anomalies, to develop rules and counterfactuals. For in these mental developments we find ways to survive what the world throws at us, and most recently in our evolution, to find some sort of meaning to our lives that transcends the amoral and indifferent mother nature.
Sperber then fills in his objection. If I, for example am preaching some belief to the next person, who then catches on to it himself, it would be wrong to see this belief as being copied because much of what makes it what it is, is already innate to the receiver. Again, if I “convince” the next person of a higher power, the belief has not been copied, but rather triggered in them. So the memetic perspective, which views culture as bits of information that move from one mind to the next, does not work. It may be an interesting way of viewing culture, and as Sperber states, may have a very limited degree of folk-psychological value in specific circumstances, but as a project whose aim is to do empirical, predictive work, Memetics is on the whole, a failure.
My project is to expand upon Sperber’s objection, and add to it the claim that all units of culture are not created equal. My thesis is this: A unit of cultural information can be best seen as a meme to the extent that its replicative success does not rely upon innate genetic dispositions. And on the flip side of this coin: To the extent that a unit of cultural information relies more heavily upon innate genetic dispositions is the same extent to which it should not be understood in memetic terms. I am, essentially, agreeing with Sperber’s point of objection, but I wish to claim that the objection applies to some aspects of human culture and not others.
Pending the development of a complete taxonomy of cultural traits and their origins in evolutionary processes, I’ll limit my argument to what I believe to be a few good examples of cultural information on either end of this proposed explanatory spectrum. On the one end is cultural information that has its origins in innate dispositions. Religious beliefs would fall here, as would perhaps racist, sexist, and homophobic beliefs and propaganda. The best way, arguably, to explain beliefs of these sorts is the way that has been proposed by evolutionary psychology. You may remember a bit of this from the Dennett/Fodor class. It is the theory that much of human psychological dispositions, and cultural norms, are explained by adaptive survival and reproduction strategies that our evolutionary ancestors used. What psychologists call “in-group” and “out-group” beliefs, referring to racism, classism, sexism, etc, are understood very well in evolutionary psychological terms and study, and very poorly by Memetics.
On the other end of the spectrum lie bits of cultural information whose success doesn’t seem to depend on these kinds of genetic dispositions, and therefore can avoid Sperber’s objection. Take the example of the game of chess. I’ve chosen this example because I know many of you quite enjoy the game. Certain chess strategies are clearly more popular than others, certain chess openings considered better, more conducive to winning positions. Consider the strategy “aim for center control.” This is a meme. It is genuinely copied, because when it is transmitted from one person to the next, there is no genetic, or innate component. The receiver has genuinely absorbed new information.
Or, consider a television commercial. The notion of the sexy bikini model with a budweiser in hand, however well it may stick in your mind, is poorly understood as a meme, because the power of the idea is merely to incite pre-existing ideas of sex appeal that many men carry with them at all hours of the day. However, the commercial’s catchy musical jingle may possibly be understood best as a meme, because what it appeals to isn’t innate. If anything, it appeals to our liking toward particular chord patterns, rhythms, and harmonies. These dispositions are built culturally, not genetically, and the evidence for this claim lies in the lack of cross-cultural musical similarities.
To conclude, I’d like to qualify my thesis by noting that it is not a-priori. The debate is empirical, and if it comes to be the case that as we better understand the origins of culture, we are able to explain more and more of it in terms of genetic predispositions, the less weight my argument will hold. Perhaps Memetics will be ruled out altogether, and be deemed in the history books as a cautionary tale for young philosophers who want to Darwinize everything. Unfortunately for Dawkins and Dennett, the religious trends they so vehemently criticize are not best explained in memetic terms. This is not to say that their criticisms are invalid, but rather that their angle of approach will do them little good, other than to offer interesting folk-psychological narratives.
Memetics, if it is to be a science, requires an understanding of culture that I do not believe we have at this time, and therefore I believe the question of its usefulness still remains open, and if it is ever to be useful, it will be modestly so.
Thank you.
However, I can post for your interest a transcript of today's speech. It is highly accessible and contemporary. Enjoy:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good Afternoon. My presentation today will focus primarily on Memetics, which is a hypothesized branch of science that we might also name cultural evolution devised originally by Richard Dawkins in his book “The selfish Gene.” My intention is to outline his theories of gene selection and its analogous meme selection and one or two of their applications, briefly, before moving along to the primary text to which I’ll be responding: an essay by the philosopher Dan Sperber criticizing the empirical force of the theory.
To begin: Richard Dawkins is what they call a gene selectionist. In studying the evolution of creatures, we must have some understanding of what kinds of traits are being selected for, and even more importantly, what it is that is being selected. When we think of selection for, our minds are typically drawn to standard examples such as the adaptationist advantage that the faster lion might have, the peacock with the most vivid plumage, the salmon who can swim upstream just a little bit better than its counterparts. You may all remember this from the discussion of Dennet and Fodor from two weeks back.
But what are the things being selected, specifically? Are we to say that the faster lion is selected (or at least, that it is the more probable candidate for selection)? After all, it will likely catch more prey, and thus position itself as a tempting mate within the pride. Selection on the level of the individual creature is an intuitive step, but as Dawkins argues, an incorrect one. As is thinking the unit of selection to be the group of animals, or even the species. We might best see the pride of lions itself as the unit of selection, competing with other prides for territory and survival. But again, incorrect.
The fundamental unit of selection is in fact the gene, argues Dawkins. Genes have their composition, which we call genotype, and their actual expression, which we call their phenotype. I have genotypes for blue eyes and green eyes, but my phenotype is blue, for example. When we look at evolutionary processes, try to explain them, even predict them, form experiments with them, we are best equipped to do these things when we understand that genes are the evolutionary units of selection, and that the bodies they inhabit are simply their vehicles. The fast lion is not being selected, the selected thing is rather that gene in the lion whose phenotype is this extra boost of speed.
Hence the title of his book “The Selfish Gene.” Genes are replicators; things that copy for their own sake. The word selfish implies some kind of consciousness which is of course not there, but what Dawkins means by the word is this: "the quality of being copied by a Darwinian selection process." Selfish, is a metaphor, much the same way we use the word designed metaphorically to describe the wonders of nature. Evolutionary theorists often run into trouble with these words, for when they are used, the theorists inevitably get lambasted by intelligent design proponents and quoted out of context in Jehovas’ Witness pamphlets.
Let us move forward. Memetics is fundamentally a theory that draws an analogy between bits of genetic information and bits of cultural information. We are to understand beliefs, songs, fashion trends, works of literature, quotable quotes, as units of cultural selection. That is to say, cultural ideas undergo the same kind of selective process that genes do. Their environment is our collective consciousness, and their survival and reproduction depends on the degree to which they have sticking power within minds, and the degree to which people are compelled to propagate them. Dawkins’ hailed example is religion; the belief-memes of a higher power, a divine moral authority, an immortal soul, and the like. These memes are incredibly appealing to humans, and thus have great sticking power. Those who do believe such things are compelled to propagate the information, to spread the word of the lord, as it were. Minds are vehicles, being occupied by selfish, replicating memes. As Dawkins believes, memes of the religious sort act very much the way that viruses do, invading minds, and simply making sure that they are propagated adequately before their hosts eventually die in their Jihad, or Crusade, or Inquisition.
And there you have the theory of Memetics. In the words of Dennett, another other big-name proponent: “A scholar is just a library’s way of making another library.”
Dan Sperber’s understanding of Memetics is essentially the same as the one I’ve described. His objection is roughly this: even if we can distinguish between individual units of cultural information, and in some sense view them as being passed along from person to person with varying degrees of success and failure, we cannot view memes as units of selection in any empirically workable way because memes are not being copied. The problem for Memetics has to do with why some memes are more appealing to the mind than others, why some are more easily understood, and more desirable to hold on to and disseminate then others. The basis for these things is often genetic. The cover of Time magazine about one year back was titled “The God Gene;” the article argued that a genetic disposition toward belief in a higher power is a likelihood. Chomsky argues with a large measure of academic acceptance that human language is in some sense a “filling in” of innate, genetically predisposed linguistic structures. I wouldn’t hesitate to say that there is a genetic basis for the human compulsion to order the sensory world; to explain anomalies, to develop rules and counterfactuals. For in these mental developments we find ways to survive what the world throws at us, and most recently in our evolution, to find some sort of meaning to our lives that transcends the amoral and indifferent mother nature.
Sperber then fills in his objection. If I, for example am preaching some belief to the next person, who then catches on to it himself, it would be wrong to see this belief as being copied because much of what makes it what it is, is already innate to the receiver. Again, if I “convince” the next person of a higher power, the belief has not been copied, but rather triggered in them. So the memetic perspective, which views culture as bits of information that move from one mind to the next, does not work. It may be an interesting way of viewing culture, and as Sperber states, may have a very limited degree of folk-psychological value in specific circumstances, but as a project whose aim is to do empirical, predictive work, Memetics is on the whole, a failure.
My project is to expand upon Sperber’s objection, and add to it the claim that all units of culture are not created equal. My thesis is this: A unit of cultural information can be best seen as a meme to the extent that its replicative success does not rely upon innate genetic dispositions. And on the flip side of this coin: To the extent that a unit of cultural information relies more heavily upon innate genetic dispositions is the same extent to which it should not be understood in memetic terms. I am, essentially, agreeing with Sperber’s point of objection, but I wish to claim that the objection applies to some aspects of human culture and not others.
Pending the development of a complete taxonomy of cultural traits and their origins in evolutionary processes, I’ll limit my argument to what I believe to be a few good examples of cultural information on either end of this proposed explanatory spectrum. On the one end is cultural information that has its origins in innate dispositions. Religious beliefs would fall here, as would perhaps racist, sexist, and homophobic beliefs and propaganda. The best way, arguably, to explain beliefs of these sorts is the way that has been proposed by evolutionary psychology. You may remember a bit of this from the Dennett/Fodor class. It is the theory that much of human psychological dispositions, and cultural norms, are explained by adaptive survival and reproduction strategies that our evolutionary ancestors used. What psychologists call “in-group” and “out-group” beliefs, referring to racism, classism, sexism, etc, are understood very well in evolutionary psychological terms and study, and very poorly by Memetics.
On the other end of the spectrum lie bits of cultural information whose success doesn’t seem to depend on these kinds of genetic dispositions, and therefore can avoid Sperber’s objection. Take the example of the game of chess. I’ve chosen this example because I know many of you quite enjoy the game. Certain chess strategies are clearly more popular than others, certain chess openings considered better, more conducive to winning positions. Consider the strategy “aim for center control.” This is a meme. It is genuinely copied, because when it is transmitted from one person to the next, there is no genetic, or innate component. The receiver has genuinely absorbed new information.
Or, consider a television commercial. The notion of the sexy bikini model with a budweiser in hand, however well it may stick in your mind, is poorly understood as a meme, because the power of the idea is merely to incite pre-existing ideas of sex appeal that many men carry with them at all hours of the day. However, the commercial’s catchy musical jingle may possibly be understood best as a meme, because what it appeals to isn’t innate. If anything, it appeals to our liking toward particular chord patterns, rhythms, and harmonies. These dispositions are built culturally, not genetically, and the evidence for this claim lies in the lack of cross-cultural musical similarities.
To conclude, I’d like to qualify my thesis by noting that it is not a-priori. The debate is empirical, and if it comes to be the case that as we better understand the origins of culture, we are able to explain more and more of it in terms of genetic predispositions, the less weight my argument will hold. Perhaps Memetics will be ruled out altogether, and be deemed in the history books as a cautionary tale for young philosophers who want to Darwinize everything. Unfortunately for Dawkins and Dennett, the religious trends they so vehemently criticize are not best explained in memetic terms. This is not to say that their criticisms are invalid, but rather that their angle of approach will do them little good, other than to offer interesting folk-psychological narratives.
Memetics, if it is to be a science, requires an understanding of culture that I do not believe we have at this time, and therefore I believe the question of its usefulness still remains open, and if it is ever to be useful, it will be modestly so.
Thank you.
Comments
Dan Sperber
(I hope this time you can check that I am not an impersonator)